RECENT WORK ON NIETZSCHE

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It is undeniable that the work of Friedrich Nietzsche is the subject of considerable attention by the academy. The past 20 years have seen the development of three anglophone societies, two eponymous journals, and one monograph series devoted to his study. A conservative estimate is that approximately one book about Nietzsche has been published every month for the last ten years. No doubt part of this enthusiasm is due to the fact that Nietzsche himself wrote on nearly every topic in philosophy, from ethics to metaphysics, from aesthetics to logic, from the philosophy of language to political philosophy. And this doesn’t even touch his writings as a social critic or poet. As Nietzsche boasted in *Ecce Homo* (III:4), “I have many stylistic possibilities—the most multifarious art of style that has ever been at the disposal of one man.” These facts make a review essay particularly challenging; indeed it is unlikely that a review of any length could claim to be truly comprehensive. Keeping this caveat firmly in mind, I will briefly discuss some metainterpretive disputes in anglophone Nietzsche scholarship and then proceed to examine four Nietzschean themes that have been prominent in some of the recent literature: perspectivism; systematicity, rationality, and logic; the revaluation of values; and the self.

There are two types of debates raging in Nietzsche scholarship: interpretive disputes over conceptual and philosophical issues arising out of Nietzsche’s work, and metainterpretive wrangling over how the philosophical issues should be approached and how Nietzsche’s unpublished writings ought to be considered. It is the first-order debates that are of primary concern to those interested in what light, if any, the study of Nietzsche can shed on substantive philosophical topics. The bulk of the present essay will examine some recent treatments of the more prominent of these issues. However, within the last 20 years the metainterpretive matters have received a great deal of attention, and it would be remiss to say nothing about them. One’s general approach to Nietzsche’s texts helps determine the picture of Nietzsche’s philosophy that results.

A major point of contention has to do with the treatment of Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks or *Nachlaß*. When Nietzsche went insane in January, 1889, he was at the height of his creative powers, having written no fewer than five books in the previous year. He left behind a gigantic mass of unpublished notes, drafts, and papers, some of which were assembled by his sister Elizabeth into the book known as *The Will to Power*. Nietzsche continually
reworked and reexamined his notes, planning books and even series of books, only to change his mind and abandon them. There is no way to know which, if any, of the material from the Nachlaß would have found its way into print had Nietzsche retained his faculties until the end of his life. As a result, reliance on the Nachlaß in general, and The Will to Power in particular, is a matter of considerable debate among Nietzsche’s interpreters.

Some, like Maudemarie Clark (1990, pp. 25-27) and Bernd Magnus (1988), largely eschew the use of the Nachlaß. They argue that (1) the philosophical positions articulated in the unpublished works are generally weaker than those Nietzsche saw to print; (2) the unordered nature of the Nachlaß means that the ideas expressed there have no context and are therefore malleable to almost any interpretation; (3) many of the arguments and themes in the Nachlaß are unique and have no counterpart in the published writings, thus casting doubt on Nietzsche’s attachment to them; and (4) there is evidence that Nietzsche meant for at least some of this material to be destroyed.

Others, such as Richard Schacht (1995, chap. 6) and Alexander Nehamas (1985, pp. 9-10), defend the use of the Nachlaß on the grounds that (1) we cannot justify any a priori principles about which texts are primary and which secondary; (2) all of Nietzsche’s writings are relevant to his interpretation insofar as they contribute to the construction of a coherent whole; (3) Nietzsche’s insanity was sudden, and occurred when he was in the middle of several unfinished projects that in some form would have ultimately made it to press, not when he meant his life’s work to be wrapped up and completed; and (4) as philosophers we should be interested in the merits of any argument, whether it appears in sanctified texts or not.

To be sure, there is something unsettling about a long discourse ascribing a lunatic position to Nietzsche on the basis of one theme he toyed with on a rainy afternoon in Sils-Maria and then discarded. Yet it is also disturbing to ignore most of Nietzsche’s writings regardless of their philosophical merit in order to be a “proper” interpreter of the master. In some respects the debate may be seen as between those who consider themselves primarily historians of philosophy, at pains to detail the evolution of ideas and extremely cautious in attributing arguments, and those who regard themselves as philosophers interested in historical figures, the study of whom may spur creative thought about issues currently before the profession. Many of Nietzsche’s interpreters are a bit of both, taking something of a compromise position: the published works are seen as the primary vehicles of Nietzsche’s thought, and the Nachlaß is used to clarify and supplement ideas already presented in the works Nietzsche saw to press.

It is worth noting that scholars not in the Nietzsche business may well be mystified by this whole issue. Other philosophers who left extensive unpublished notebooks after their deaths have not been treated similarly. Wittgenstein, for example, has been far more prolific in death than he ever was in life, and his interpreters guiltlessly help themselves to this posthumous material. Wittgenstein scholars do not beat their breasts over whether to rely on his Nachlaß; they just do it. Nor do they act as if works like On Certainty or Zettel aren’t “real” books and need to be treated with qualifiers and excuses in the way Nietzsche scholars behave toward The Will to Power. This pattern holds true outside of philosophy as well. On the CD version of John Coltrane’s jazz classic Giant Steps there are two versions of almost every song. One is the “official” version, as it appeared on the original LP, and
the other is an alternate take. Jazz fans may dispute which versions are better, but it is the rare Coltrane buff indeed who wouldn’t even want to hear the alternatives.

Apart from the Nachlaß controversy, the other metainterpretive issue is ideological vs. continental vs. analytic approaches to understanding Nietzsche. In the past 20 years feminist interpretations of Nietzsche (as of other topics and figures) have become popular. Just as one may not be a Marxist even if one studies Marx, publishes scholarly work on Marx, and thinks that Marx is an important philosopher, so too one may not be a feminist philosopher even if one is a philosopher (interested in certain questions about the good life, the nature of truth, and the structure of knowledge) and a feminist (believing that women and men have equal moral worth). Feminist philosophers address philosophical questions with a view toward, broadly speaking, the political and economic advancement of women. The acceptance of some sort of political agenda devoted to promoting women is a necessary condition for being a feminist philosopher.

Feminists have two main interests in Nietzsche. The first is the examination of his remarks on women, gender, and femininity. Until the past decade or so, little attention was paid to such comments. This was due to widespread agreement with the influential views of Kaufmann that Nietzsche’s remarks about women were little more than a rehearsal of the prejudices of his time. Many of the epigrams and interludes from part four of Beyond Good and Evil are strongly misogynistic in tone, and in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1:18), an old woman offers a “little truth” to Zarathustra: “Are you going to women? Do not forget the whip!”

Recently feminists have examined such passages more carefully, some suggesting that many of Nietzsche’s apparently derogatory remarks are in fact ironic, either parodying conventional stereotypes about women, or having a completely different aim altogether. For example, consider §144 from Beyond Good and Evil: “When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is usually something wrong with her sexually. Sterility itself disposes one toward a certain masculinity of taste; for man is, if I may say so, ‘the sterile animal.’” On the surface this sounds like a dismissable bit of sexism from a man with very limited adult experiences with women. Yet a closer reading suggests that the real target of Nietzsche’s criticism is scholars and their subscription to the ascetic ideal. Of course in Nietzsche’s time scholars were chiefly male, and so his aphorism is really sounding a cautionary note, warning women away from the kind of scholarly life that men have exemplified. Indeed, Nietzsche himself was just such a person; his lifelong friend Paul Düsslen believed him to have died a virgin. While it is clear that many more passages would have to be carefully scrutinized to absolve Nietzsche of the charge of misogyny, it is equally clear that this charge is no longer taken to be obviously true.

The second interest feminist philosophers have in Nietzsche is well stated by Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall in their editors’ introduction to Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche. In examining the issue of why feminists read Nietzsche, they write, “is his philosophy useful to feminist theory? . . . Can feminists use his criticisms of truth, objectivity, reason, and the autonomous subject, to challenge the exclusion of women from the history of philosophy? What can feminists gain from reading Nietzsche?” (Oliver and Pearsall 1998, p. 2). That is, feminist philosophers want to harness Nietzsche’s ideas either directly to promote their political goals, or to lend his imprimatur to theories
that serve them. As in the case of Marxism, one must already have certain ideological commitments to be sympathetic to this approach to scholarship.

The final metainterpretive issue is the familiar division between analytic and continental philosophy. Like Husserl and Meinong, Nietzsche inspires both analytic and continental followers. A detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s continental influence, especially on the French, can be found in Alan Schrift’s recent article “Nietzsche’s French Legacy.” Here I will make only a few brief comments. Nietzsche, continental style, burst from the European mainland just over 20 years ago. In 1977 The New Nietzsche, edited by David B. Allison, marked the trail for continental interpreters. This pivotal collection contained the first English translations of essays by many of the leading French Nietzscheans, including Deleuze, Klossowski, Blanchot, Granier, Blondel, Derrida, and Kofman. The following year Derrida published Étperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche, which came out in 1979 in English as Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles. Since then, more continental work on Nietzsche has appeared in translation, thus reaching a broader audience.

At the risk of painting with too broad a brush, many continental interpreters regard Nietzsche as a purely critical thinker. The subtitle of Twilight of the Idols is “How to Philosophize With a Hammer,” and the critical Nietzsche is taken to smash old philosophic idols and in so doing herald philosophers yet to come. Nietzsche explicitly assumes the mantle of harbinger in Beyond Good and Evil (§44), a book subtitled “Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future.” In this role, Nietzsche stands at the boundary of a great change, one that marks the end of the modern period in philosophy and the turning point toward postmodernism. Thus Martin Heidegger regarded Nietzsche as the final philosopher of the Western tradition, the one who pronounces the last rites over metaphysics.

By contrast, analytic philosophers tend to view Nietzsche as a radical, but a radical who fits squarely in the main traditions of Western philosophy. For them, Nietzsche touches idols with a tuning fork, determining which ones are hollow, as he himself says in the Foreword to Twilight of the Idols. This endangers traditional philosophy as much as anarchists threaten princes: “only since they have been shot at do they again sit firmly on their thrones” (Twilight of the Idols I:36). To be sure, Nietzsche rejects well-entrenched philosophical views such as those of Schopenhauer, Kant, and Plato, but by doing so he is part of the grand conversation with them. His diatribes against metaphysics and traditional moral concepts undermine philosophy itself no more than the Logical Positivists’ rejection of ethics and metaphysics. That is to say, self-criticism is part of the very nature of the discipline and even declaring whole subfields to be humbug does not require a perspective outside of philosophy itself. For analytics, Nietzsche is critical of the received tradition but makes his own positive philosophical contributions as a replacement.

In discussing the substantive philosophical issues in Nietzsche scholarship of the last 20 years I will look primarily at his loosely analytic interpreters. This is for three reasons. First, recent continental scholarship has already been adequately recounted in Schrift’s aforementioned article, and there is no reason to go over the same ground here. Second, most readers of this journal are analytic philosophers, many of whom may be interested in keeping an eye on the Nietzsche industry.
business still peripheral to mainstream analytic philosophy. Third, Nietzsche himself displays great respect for rigor and clarity. For example, in *On the Genealogy of Morals* (preface, §2), he celebrates “[a] fundamental will of knowledge, pointing imperiously into the depths, speaking more and more precisely, demanding greater and greater precision. For this alone is fitting for a philosopher.” The rejection of obscurantism is a hallmark of the analytic approach.

**Perspectivism**

Nehamas has recently written, “For many years now discussion of Nietzsche has revolved centrally around the theory that is known as ‘Perspectivism.’” This is a very slippery, difficult topic in Nietzsche, with which many commentators have grappled. Clark, Nehamas, R. Lanier Anderson, and Brian Leiter interpret perspectivism as an epistemological thesis, roughly, the idea that no interpretations of reality are privileged, and that there is no knowledge unconditioned by particular, idiosyncratic interpretive interests. Given this view, a problem of self-referential inconsistency seems to arise for Nietzsche. Namely, what status should we ascribe to his own claims? Does he claim to know them? Are they true? If neither, and Nietzsche is just presenting some random speculations that he thinks are no better than a midnight dorm-room bull session, then it is hard to see why we should take him seriously. On the other hand, if Nietzsche is asserting his views as true things that he knows, then this undermines his own contention that no interpretation of reality is privileged. Nietzsche is sensitive to this charge, writing in *Beyond Good and Evil* (§22): “Supposing that this also is only interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this objection?—well, so much the better.” There are two prominent responses to the inconsistency problem: the first is that the doctrine itself is merely perspectively true. Nietzsche is just offering his personal interpretation, one which “no one else is easily entitled to” (*Beyond Good and Evil* §43). The second main solution is that at least some of Nietzsche’s claims (the perspectivist thesis for example) must be offered as absolute truths, items true in every perspective. No more comprehensive perspectivism is possible, and ascribing one to Nietzsche is self-defeating.

Clark has argued that her interpretation of perspectivism escapes the preceding puzzle. She argues that the self-refutation problem arises only if one accepts the falsification thesis, to wit: all of our beliefs or sentences falsify and distort reality. This thesis she believes is motivated only if one has a prior commitment to a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth, namely the view that true propositions are true because they correspond to Kantian things-in-themselves. Clark plausibly maintains that Nietzsche rejected the thing-in-itself as self-contradictory (1990, pp. 46–47, 95–103), thereby warranting rejection of the metaphysical correspondence theory (pp. 40, 50, 60–61). Having renounced the thing-in-itself and the metaphysical correspondence theory, he then jettisoned the falsification thesis (pp. 103–124). Finally, Nietzsche replaced the metaphysical correspondence theory with perspectivism.

That Nietzsche renounced Kantian things-in-themselves and a metaphysical correspondence theory all seems reasonable. More contentiously, Clark goes on to argue that instead of a metaphysical correspondence theory, Nietzsche supports a minimal correspondence theory. Minimal correspondence derives from Convention T, the thesis that an extensionally adequate
theory of truth for a language $L$ is one that entails all sentences of the form ""$S$ is true in $L$, if and only if $S$." Clark holds that perspectivism is not self-refuting when conjoined with the minimal correspondence theory and that Nietzsche not only did but must adopt the minimal correspondence theory. However, it is difficult to see how Nietzsche could adopt both perspectivism and the minimal correspondence theory. Tarski's version of the minimal correspondence theory rejects indexing, except to a language. Davidson too, on whom Clark relies for her interpretation of the minimal correspondence theory, rejects indexing truth to a perspective. Davidson writes, ""[T]he truth of an utterance depends on just two things: what the words spoken mean, and how the world is arranged. There is no... relativism to a conceptual scheme, a way of viewing things, a perspective"" (1986, p. 309). There is obvious inconsistency between a theory that does and one that does not index truth to a perspective. Clark fails to explain why this inconsistency does not undermine her defense of perspectivism. She states that anyone who rejects minimal correspondence "discards the very concept of truth" (1990, p. 33). Nevertheless, it looks as if Nietzsche, no abider of common sense, is prepared to do just that and require even the truth of T-sentences to be relativized to perspectives.

Schacht has tried to get round the whole problem by arguing that Nietzsche's perspectivism, while epistemic in nature, is not a first-order theory about knowledge, but is rather a second-order philosophical methodology. Schacht writes that

[Nietzsche] describes his efforts in his various works as attempts to approach certain phenomena—such as forms of art, morality, religion, society, and scientific and philosophical thinking—from "perspectives" in which they are not ordinarily viewed, and from which other insights into them may be gained, leading to their better comprehension. . . . This might well be called a "perspectival" kind of thinking. . . . [H]is "perspectivist" pronouncements with respect to knowledge can and should be understood along similar lines. . . . [T]he "perspectivism" to which Nietzsche is committed has most fundamentally to do with the strategy or method of his kind of philosophy. (1995, pp. 91–92)

There is certainly something to be said for Schacht's interpretation. Especially in the more aphoristic books, Nietzsche tends to skip from topic to topic, often with little recognizable segue, only to reexamine earlier issues many pages (or even books) later from a different angle. This is what makes a book like Daybreak more suitable for "dipping into," than reading straight through (D 454). Nietzsche is of course aware of this style, writing in The Gay Science (§381), "I approach deep problems like cold baths: quickly into them and quickly out again." Schacht's interpretation also finds support in On the Genealogy of Morals (III:12):

But precisely because we seek knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to such resolute reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations. . . . to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future "objectivity"—the latter understood not as "contemplation without interest" (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to control one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. . . . There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be.
If Schacht’s argument is that Nietzsche’s methodological perspectivism entails that a good thinker will be sensitive to other points of view and will try to incorporate these as she sees fit into her own perspective, then it is plausible. However, if Schacht’s argument is that perspectivism is applicable only at the methodological level, then, given other things that Nietzsche claims about perspectivism, it seems that he does not go far enough. Nietzsche’s perspectivism runs deeper than methodology alone.

Others, such as Richardson (1996) and Poellner (1995), maintain that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is not epistemic so much as it is ontological. According to the ontological interpretation, Nietzsche argues that the world in itself (if we can even help ourselves to this suspicious Kantian notion) is a kind of Heraclitean flux, with no determinate structure (cf. The Gay Science § 111). Objects—entia—are identified as such as a result of our cognitive needs, idiosyncratic needs that might have been different. In this way, Nietzsche maintains, “we have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live” (The Gay Science § 121). In The Twilight of the Idols (III:5) he calls it “error” and “prejudice” to “posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, being.” Belief in such things is no more than a convenient “fiction,” without which “man could not live” (Beyond Good and Evil § 4). Instead of promulgating more of these “errors,” Nietzsche offered a bundle theory of objects. Controversial because the view is more highly developed in Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks than in the books he saw to press, the theory holds that objects are collections or aggregates of non-substances. Traditional bundle theories consider objects to be bundles of properties. Nietzsche took them to be bundles of what he called “power quanta.” So, for example, there is no absolute fact about whether the constellation Orion is an object; whether it is is partly a function of the perspective taken on its component parts. According to Richardson (1996, p. 12), perspectives “are wills to power,” and in this way power and the will to power enter into Nietzsche’s ontology at a very basic level.

The only book-length treatment of perspectivism is by Hales and Welshon (2000). According to Hales and Welshon, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is more than a methodology or a metaphor. They maintain that “perspectivism” for Nietzsche denotes no single thesis, or even a specific set of related doctrines. Rather it serves as a protean concept that plays a role akin to a regulative ideal, or a unifying theme throughout his reflections on truth, epistemology, ontology, identity, ethics, causality, etc. It is therefore a mistake to declare that perspectivism is “really” an epistemic thesis, or “really” a theory of truth, or “really” an ontology. In a note composed in 1885 or 1886, Nietzsche wrote

That the value of the world lies in our interpretation (—that other interpretations than merely human ones are perhaps somewhere possible—); that previous interpretations have been perspective valuations by virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the will to power, for the growth of power; that every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every strengthening and increase of power opens up new perspectives and means believing in new horizons—this idea permeates my writings. (The Will to Power § 616)

Hales and Welshon argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism reveals systematic connections throughout Nietzsche’s philosophy. They hold that his rejection of absolute truth and his endorsement of ontological anti-realism are offered together
as complementary. They try to show that Nietzsche promotes a view of the world as dynamic and fluid, a Heraclitean flux that we organize into a rational form to suit our purposes. We make the world formulatable and calculable for us; other species, for example, may reify different objects in their conception of reality. This ontology culminates in a bundle theory of objects similar to those developed earlier by Berkeley and later by Russell. Nietzsche’s bundle ontology has far-reaching metaphysical implications. For example, it leads to a perspectival assessment of causation. This causal perspectivism underwrites the rejection of claims made by scientists and certain metaphysicists that they have discovered the laws of the universe that are universally binding, and it replaces such claims with the claim that causality is a kind of interpretation or perspective taken by one sector of the world on another.

The theory of knowledge we are left with is one in which objective knowledge is initiated by the perspectivity of epistemic capacities and the perspectival constitution of the object of knowledge. Ontological perspectivism claims that there are no facts in the world to which ideas and propositions could possibly correspond, even if, counterfactually, epistemic capacities were not perspectival. Given such an ontology, Nietzsche takes de re knowledge as knowledge directed on perspectival bundle-objects, and offers an account of de dicto knowledge as a form of supercontextualism informed by his perspectivist treatment of truth. Recent epistemologists, like Keith DeRose and David Lewis, have defended contextualist theories about justification according to which “justified,” like “here” and “now,” is indexical, with its correct application partly dependent on context of use. Hales and Welshon argue that Nietzsche takes this approach one step further by making truth itself contextual, indexed to perspectives.

**SYSTEMATICITY, RATIONALITY, AND LOGIC**

Nietzsche was a master stylist who handled “language like a flexible rapier, feeling from his arm down to his toes the dangerous delight of the quivering, oversharpe blade that desires to bite, hiss, cut” (*Beyond Good and Evil* §246). The power of Nietzsche’s prose is such that when he turns his critical weapons on philosophical positions, religions, or persons—which was often—it seems to the reader that nothing is left standing. “I am warlike by nature. Attacking is one of my instincts,” he wrote in *Ecce Homo* (I:7). Nietzsche’s combative approach to philosophy, coupled with his fearlessness in examining cherished values, makes it all too easy to conclude that he is a Caligula of philosophers: too much power and too much crazy talk. Nietzsche found in his predecessors an unquestioning faith in the importance of logic and reason, and a concomitant drive to construct philosophical systems. And so he trained his sights on these cherished values. As a consequence, many have concluded that Nietzsche is simply out to blast systematic, rational thinking and offers no positive alternative conceptions.

Allison, Mary Warnock, and Karl Jaspers all argue that Nietzsche’s style of writing is unsystematic, and therefore his philosophy is too.14 However, this conclusion is a non sequitur, as Nietzsche himself points out. In *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* (§128) he writes, “Against the shortsighted.—Do you think this work must be fragmentary because I give it to you (and have to give it to you) in fragments?” Nietzsche’s arguments are regularly enthymemes, and often he merely submits an opinion without a supporting argument. Neither these facts, nor his tendency to jump about from topic to topic, show that there is no underlying coherence to his thought.
Others defend Nietzsche's supposed lack of systematic thought on the basis of two passages: "Systematizers practice a kind of play-acting: in as much as they want to fill out their system and round off its horizon, they have to present their weaker qualities in the same style as their stronger—they try to impersonate whole and uniformly strong natures" (Daybreak §318). The latter reads, "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity" (Twilight of the Idols I:26). Ofelia Schutte (1984, pp. 7, 11) argues on the basis of these aphorisms that Nietzsche is either unsystematic or inconsistent with the passages just cited. She holds that in order to maintain consistency Nietzsche abandoned earlier plans to develop a systematic theory of value, and never developed a systematic theory of truth. Instead his philosophy is Dionysian and poetic, aiming at no universal truths.

Schutte is drawing too much out of these passages, however. A more modest interpretation is that Nietzsche is simply stressing that it is disingenuous to retain one's weaker arguments because not enough of a curve can be drawn through the data points of one's stronger arguments. This psychological weakness is a pitfall that would-be systematizers must guard against. His criticism is not that a systematic philosophy must inevitably be in error (recall his respect for Spinoza; cf. Schacht [1995, pp. 167-86]), but that a will to a system is a lack of integrity. That is, it is a piece of dishonesty to decide, antecedently to all investigation, that reality has a systematic nature. This presupposes without argument something plainly contentious. Thus Nietzsche mistrusts, with good reason, systematizers who may well be forcing the square peg of the world into the round hole of their theory. Yet there is nothing dishonest about conducting philosophical inquiry, developing theories and arguments, and finding at the end that one's reflections have turned out to be structured and interconnected. Indeed, among recent interpreters, Richardson (1996) has argued most strenuously that when one takes a synoptic view of Nietzsche's philosophy, one discovers broad systematic connections.

If Richardson is right, then how are we to understand Nietzsche's critique of reason and logic? In passages such as Human, All Too Human (§11), Nietzsche writes, "logic ... rests on assumptions that do not correspond to anything in the real world." In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche devotes an entire section of the book to "The Problem of Socrates," which is followed immediately by a critique of "Reason in Philosophy." In part five of the latter section, he suggests that it is language, with its particular structure and apparent ontological commitments, that misleads us about the nature of reason. In The Will to Power §516, Nietzsche opines that "Logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious entities that we have created. Logic is the attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of being posited by ourselves; more correctly, to make it formulatable and calculable for us."

It is no surprise that many have thought that in a celebration of relativism and Dionysian subjectivity, Nietzsche is out to torpedo reason from Socrates through the Enlightenment. Allan Bloom, in his commercially successful 1987 book The Closing of the American Mind, did much to promote this conception of Nietzsche. He writes, "Socrates is alive and must be overcome. It is essential to recognize that this is the issue in Nietzsche" (1987, p. 308). Similarly, Linda Williams (1993, pp. 128-129) takes Nietzsche's critical remarks to show that consistency is not a value to which Nietzsche subscribed, and a standard to which he should not be held. Schutte concludes from such passages that
Nietzsche viewed logic more as an enemy than a friend, contemplated silencing logic, tended to erase the need for logic, set up logic and life as adversaries, and meant his teachings to go beyond logic (1984, pp. 28–36).

Others have argued that a vision of Nietzsche as a wild-eyed irrationalist is vastly oversimplistic. A more balanced examination of the texts shows that Nietzsche has many positive things to say about reason and logic. In Human, All Too Human (§265) he writes, “[s]chooling has no more important task than to teach rigorous thinking, careful judgment, logical conclusions,” and in Human, All Too Human (§271), he notes that “[t]he greatest progress men have made lies in their learning to draw correct conclusions” (Nietzsche's italics). This is echoed in Twilight of the Idols (VIII:7), where he denigrates German universities on the grounds that “even among students of philosophy themselves, the theory, the practice, the vocation of logic is beginning to die out.” Likewise, in The Gay Science (§191), he plainly recognizes a difference between good and bad arguments, and vehemently critiques the latter, and at §348 he lavishly praises the Jews for arguing logically, concluding that Europe owes the Jews thanks for their promotion of “cleaner intellectual habits.”

Poellner discusses these issues at length, writing, “Giving up logic only amounts to a liberation of thought if one considers the absence of thought, what might metaphorically be described as an undifferentiated blur, to be liberating” (1995, p. 291). Whatever kinds of human liberation Nietzsche wishes to effect, he certainly does not want to replace confused thinking with no thought at all. Poellner concludes, “as we have seen throughout this study, it is by no means the case that he is simply unconcerned with and uninterested in rational argument” (p. 301). For Clark, Nietzsche’s criticisms of logic and reason developed over time. She maintains that prior to Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche was sympathetic to the view that that all of our beliefs or sentences falsify and distort reality, and that his anti-logic and reason diatribes are found in pre-BGE works. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche rejected the idea of Kantian things-in-themselves as self-contradictory and subsequently came to realize that the real problem was not with logic, but with the metaphysical correspondence thesis that true propositions are true because they correspond to things-in-themselves. Having thus refined his position, Nietzsche then went on to develop a perspectival theory of truth, and defend (particularly in The Antichrist) the interpretations of the world produced by science. In any case, Nietzsche’s critical project with respect to reason was not slash-and-burn, but far more akin to familiar versions of anti-realism.

In a similar vein, according to Hales and Welshon (2000, chap. 2), Nietzsche argues that our faith in grammar generates a faith in logic, which is not too much better than the faith in the old God, since both lead us into the same metaphysical errors. As he puts it in The Wanderer and His Shadow (§11), “a philosophical mythology lies concealed in language which breaks out again at every moment, however careful one may be otherwise.” Thus we are not getting rid of God, or more accurately his shadow, by continuing to place our faith in grammar. Nietzsche's contention then is that the structure of our language encodes a mistaken metaphysics, and the methodology of using linguistic analysis to reveal the structure of the world is doomed to failure. Since Nietzsche regards logic as the deep structure of language, and any system of logic makes a semantic commitment
to entities, it follows that there is reason to suspect the entities it takes to be fundamental. What is needed, Nietzsche thinks, is an investigation into the semantics of natural language and the sort of entities semantics requires, therefore an investigation into language itself. One way of capturing Nietzsche’s semantic concerns is then to say that he is an anti-realist about natural language semantics. That is, he rejects the claimed mind-independence of the entities that are interpretations of expressions of natural language, even while he is sanguine about logical syntax. Uninterpreted syntactical formulas make no assumptions about things, and are, as Nietzsche puts it in *On Truth and Lie in a Non-Moral Sense*, “empty husks” that tell us nothing about reality.

**THE REVALUATION OF ALL VALUES**

Nietzsche devoted considerable energy to the issue of ethics and morality. He addresses this topic in nearly every work, and devotes two entire books to its exploration. E. E. Kleinis’s recent comment that “Nietzsche’s principal concern was with values. From the beginning of his productive life to the end, questions of value predominate” only slightly overstates the case. Nietzsche was partly interested in offering a psychological/historical account of morality, one that explains how we arrived at the morality we have. A good bit of *Beyond Good and Evil* addresses this matter, and it received its full treatment in *On the Genealogy of Morals*. In these works Nietzsche argues that ancient morality was a Thrasymachian affair, with powerful “old masters” imposing their will on less fortunate “slaves.” Things went topsy-turvy when Christianity ushered in the slave revolt in morality. Instead of the *sumnum bonum* being simply domination through strength, now the value of pity is promoted and slogans such as “the last shall be first and the first shall be last” and “the meek shall inherit the earth” take the fore. Explaining exactly how the “slaves” accomplished this inversion of natural values is the chief task of *Genealogy*. Commentators have focused less on Nietzsche’s origins story than they have on his second interest in ethics, that of revaluating received values and presenting his own ethical theories.

Nietzsche was tremendously excited at the prospect of sweeping away Christian morality and developing new values in its stead. At the end (§62) of *The Antichrist*, the first installment of a projected four-volume series to be called *The Revaluation of All Values*, he even suggests that time be calculated not from the first day of Christianity, but from its last—namely, the day *The Antichrist* was completed. Tragically, four months later Nietzsche went irrevocably insane, and the remaining three books of this project went unwritten. Thus his own ethical views were never completely developed, although there are enough reflections and tidbits in his published writings to reconstruct the tenor of his thought.

“Christianity is called the religion of pity,” wrote Nietzsche (*The Antichrist* §7), and his rejection of the value of pity is at the root of many of the objections he levels at Christian morality. Indeed, the revaluation and critique of moral values in the *Genealogy* were spurred by Nietzsche’s reflections on “this problem of the value of pity and of the morality of pity” (*On the Genealogy of Morals*, P:6). Recently, Martha Nussbaum has persuasively argued that Nietzsche’s criticisms of pity are not an example of a fascist, boot-in-the-face ethic, but ultimately stem from Stoic influences (1994). According to Nussbaum, pity requires, and rests upon, these three
beliefs: (1) the suffering of the other is significant and not trivial; (2) the suffering is not the fault of the sufferer; and (3) the pitier’s possibilities are similar to those of the pitied. The first two claims are about the logic of pity, whereas the last is about the psychology of pity, and reveals its connection to fear. Part of the Stoic critique of pity is that these three beliefs are all false. (1) depends upon a view of external objects and material possessions as necessary for happiness or the good life, which the Stoics reject. (2) depends on the sufferer thinking that these external things are valuable. Since this is a mistaken view, they are to blame for their own suffering. (3) depends upon the pitier accepting the view that these external things are important or the good life. If the pitier does not accept this (as the Stoics recommend) then the pitier’s possibilities are not those of the sufferer.

Nussbaum finds six arguments in Nietzsche against the value of pity.

1. Pity acknowledges weakness and insufficiency in the pitied, and so amounts to contempt for and a diminution of dignity in the pitied. This is so because pity implies that the person’s own efforts to lead the good life are inadequate, that the worldly conditions that cause the suffering are of great importance.

2. Pity acknowledges weakness and insufficiency in the pitier. It makes the pitier aware of our “impotence” and of “human vulnerability and fragility in general” (Daybreak §132).

3. Pity is not really altruistic, but egoistic. Pity is a means to feel better about myself (Daybreak §133, §145); at least I’m better off than that poor slob.

4. Pity does no good, and only increases the amount of suffering. Pity has bad consequences insofar as it encourages the pitied to remain in the state of suffering. This last is like giving attention to a spoiled child who clamors for it—it only exacerbates the situation.

5. We pity people for things that are not bad, but in fact good for them. “What does not kill me makes me stronger,” in the famous words of Twilight of the Idols (I:8).

6. Pity is connected with revenge and even cruelty. Once we grant the importance of external things to the good life, then we open ourselves up to all sorts of injuries and harms. And once we do this “we have no end of occasions for envy and resentment against those who cause us to suffer in one way or another” (Nussbaum 1994, p. 154).

Nussbaum is not entirely sympathetic to Nietzsche’s critique of pity, chastising him on the grounds that he fails to take into account basic human needs—one needs to be fed in order to think well. Without pity, without a belief that external goods are of some measure important, there is no grounds for social redistribution of goods. Also, Nussbaum sees a kind of strength in willingness to form relationships that could go badly, and so being “porous rather than totally hard” (1994, p. 160).

However we might assess Nietzsche’s criticisms of Christian values, it would be a gross error to suppose that Nietzsche was interested in a return to the morality of the old masters. He makes it quite clear that Christianity did have this salutary effect: it lifted human beings from the ranks of the brute animals and made them deep and interesting (On the Genealogy of Morals I:7; cf. II:16). A return to the morality of brutes is impossible and undesirable. Instead we must ask ourselves what kinds of values are possible for modern humans, and which ones will lead to flourishing lives. As Nietzsche declares in the preface
(§6) to the Genealogy, “[W]e need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called into question” (Nietzsche’s italics). But how is Nietzsche to revalue all values? As Philippa Foot writes, “the idea of such a thing is enough to make one’s head spin.” Fortunately, Nietzsche not only takes himself to have principled reasons for questioning the moral tradition but has a methodology for doing so.

According to Bergmann (1988, pp. 44–45), Geuss (1997, pp. 10–12), Hales (1995), and Schacht (1983, pp. 354–356), Nietzsche’s strategy for determining the value of the principles of popular morality is to weigh them against what he takes to have intrinsic value, namely life. Nietzsche emphasizes this approach in several places, including Twilight of the Idols (V:5) where he writes, “When we speak of value we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us when we establish values.” Life, Nietzsche claims in Beyond Good and Evil (§13), is will to power, and (according to Twilight of the Idols V:5) its value is exempt from our revaluations. This, coupled with his contention in The Antichrist (§2) that “good” is all that heightens power and the will to power, has led some commentators to think that Nietzsche was a kind of consequentialist. Michael Slote goes so far as to state that “Nietzsche is commonly thought of as a perfectionistic consequentialist” (1998, p. 23). “Commonly thought of” overstates matters rather dramatically, although a case can be made that Nietzsche was a consequentialist with an unusual vision of the good. When one examines his frequent tirades against utilitarianism, it becomes clear that his real complaints are about the pursuit of happiness, not the consequentialist structure of the theory. That is, Nietzsche rejects happiness as the sumum bonum, but this does not mean that nothing is a sumum bonum; indeed, life or will to power seem to fit the bill.

A far more frequent interpretation, one that has received considerable attention in the past decade, is that Nietzsche was a virtue theorist in the broadly Aristotelian tradition. Among those offering this sort of reading are Hunt (1991), Welshon (1992), Slote (1998), and Swanton (1998); Berkowitz (1995) also emphasizes the importance of virtue in Nietzsche’s positive ethical thought. Aristotle maintained that there was a conceptual connection between human flourishing and moral virtues, which were to spring from dispositions to act on the basis of reason. What counts as rational behavior is determined both by intrinsic human nature and the historical, cultural traditions in which an agent finds herself. More egoistic than other ethical theories, Aristotle promoted the development of personal moral character as the chief end of our ethical practice. Nietzsche seems to concur: “Is there anything more beautiful than looking for one’s own virtues?” he asks in Beyond Good and Evil (§214). “One thing is needful,” Nietzsche writes in The Gay Science (§290), “To give style to one’s character.”

What is this “style” Nietzsche recommends? How does he suppose that new philosophers are to form their characters? Obviously, not all commentators offer the same virtue-theoretic treatment of Nietzsche, although there are broad agreements. In what follows I offer a synopsis of one commentator’s (Welshon’s) analysis. Welshon divides up the virtues discussed by Nietzsche into two kinds, which he calls “pervasive virtues” and “specific virtues.” Pervasive virtues are those psychological attributes exemplified by all new philosophers; they are virtues found in all kinds of healthy souls. These
include the love of enemies, magnanimity toward the weak, love of solitude, spiritual independence, discipline, pride, and courage. If these attributes are in fact all to be exemplified by the new philosophers, the natural question that then arises is, what kind of life will it be with these traits lead? Nietzsche answers this question by developing his theory of the experimental life.

The experimental life is the life of engaging in way of living for a time, and then adopting a new perspective (Daybreak §573) and a new set of beliefs. It is a dangerous life, one of dancing near abysses and sailing in uncharted seas (The Gay Science §283, 347; Beyond Good and Evil §205). It is in living this experimental life that we become legislators and creators of morality (Beyond Good and Evil §211, The Antichrist §11) and we each create for ourselves what Welshon calls the “specific virtues.” New philosophers create new and different virtues for themselves as they engage in new experiments and sample new ways of living (The Gay Science §120, Beyond Good and Evil §43). Nietzsche holds that it is the characteristic right of masters to create values (Beyond Good and Evil §261), and one can become a modern master, a new philosopher, only by exemplifying the Nietzschean pervasive virtues, leading the experimental life, and so creating one’s own (“specific”) virtues. Here we see an aspect of Nietzsche’s moral naturalism: the complex moral perspectivism of the new philosophers is made possible only by the discipline of the psychological traits of the pervasive virtues (see Beyond Good and Evil §188). That is, the pervasive virtues are necessary conditions for leading the experimental life. Unless one has self-discipline, solitude, courage, independence, etc., one will be unable to live on the margins of society, reject the values of good and evil, and escape from the boring, petty, day-to-day lifestyle to which we have become accustomed (see The Gay Science §290).

These pervasive virtues, these psychological traits of the new philosopher, are needed if we are to engage in an active response to the nihilism with which the collapse of Christian morality has left us. Without the Nietzschean (pervasive) virtues we may be able to change our lives in minor ways, and alter our perspectives in minute ways, but we will not be able to effect revolutionary changes in our lives. The Nietzschean virtues may be said to “bound” the experimental life, but Nietzsche considers them to be required to maximize the range of perspectives available to us. They are more liberating than restricting. This is why we are unable to experimentally abandon self-discipline, for example. Once we do so we will enter a perspective we cannot escape. Self-discipline is something we need to be able to change perspectives at all.

Whatever the nature of Nietzsche’s positive ethics, there is a residual question of for whom he intends this ethics. When Nietzsche writes in The Antichrist (§11) that “each one of us should devise his own virtue, his own categorical imperative,” does he really expect that everyone ought to, or is capable of, developing their own values and leading the experimental life? Leiter argues that Nietzsche aims his ethics not at humanity in general, but at the “highest men” (Leiter 1995). It is their lives, their power, their flourishing that is to be enhanced by embracing the eternal recurrence, cultivating the Nietzschean values, etc. This delimiting of the moral community is not terribly surprising, as Nietzsche frequently claims that his writings are meant for a select few and that possibly his audience has not even been born yet (cf. The Antichrist, preface). Only
certain psychological types are ready for, or even entitled to, Nietzsche’s kind of morality. Moral “slaves” are destined to remain slaves (cf. The Will to Power §287) and, of course, do not deserve pity for it. Writing of psychological, moral health, Nietzsche claimed that “it cannot be the task of the healthy to nurse the sick and make them well” (On the Genealogy of Morals III 15). Indeed, the “weak and ill-constituted shall perish” and the proper attitude of the higher men, or “we Hyperboreans” is “to help them to do so” (The Antichrist §2).

THE SELF

Given the sort of perspectival, anti-realist things Nietzsche is prone to write about truth and ontology, and the very individualistic way he approaches ethics, one might reasonably wonder how he construes the self. Nietzsche seems to be attracted to two contradictory theories of personal identity. One such theory is the No-Self view: there is nothing that corresponds to a substantial self, soul, ego, or I, and the common belief in these things is erroneous. For instance, in Beyond Good and Evil (§17) he writes that “it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject ‘I’ is the condition of the predicate ‘think.’” In Twilight of the Idols (III:5) Nietzsche claims that it is a “rude fetishism” that “believes in the ‘ego,’ in the ego as being, in the ego as substance.” Commentators such as Schacht emphasize this strain in Nietzsche’s thought.23

On the other hand, Nietzsche does seem to offer a theory of personal identity, namely a type of Bundle Theory in which the self is a bundle of drives, affects, instincts, and impulses. He maintains that the drives compete against each other for power and dominance, and that the unity of the self derives from a sort of pragmatic decision about the individuation of this collection. There is no diachronically identical subject; rather a self is, as Amelie Rorty has put it, “a loose configuration of habits, habits of thought and perception and motivation and action [i.e., character traits], acquired at different stages, in the service of different ends.”24 Nietzsche’s frequent remarks that the self is a political entity (The Will to Power §490, §660; Beyond Good and Evil §12) reinforces this view of the self as a loosely organized federation of functional states and dispositions. Drive and affect, along with impulse, need, and desire are for Nietzsche the basic constituents of the self, for the self is a “communality” (The Will to Power §492) of such phenomena or an “aristocracy” (The Will to Power §490) of them or a “social structure” of them (Beyond Good and Evil §12). Thus Robert Morrison writes, “Nietzsche viewed the person as a constellation of various fluctuating forces whose individual and collective nisus was expressed in terms of a striving to overcome all resistance and accumulate more power.”25 Similarly, Christoph Cox maintains “the subject, Nietzsche argues, is just such an assemblage [of myriad actions, happenings, effects, and appearances].”26 Nehamas also seems to defend this interpretation, writing “in reducing the agent self to the totality of its actions (‘doings’), Nietzsche is once again applying his doctrine of the will to power, part of which consists in the identification of every object in the world with the sum of its effects on every other thing.”27

So which is it? Is the self no more than a linguistic illusion, a lingering shadow of the dead god that no longer has a theological justification? Or is there a self, but one that is a bundle of drives and instincts whose composition varies over time? Morrison (1997) and Hales and Welshon
Consider three representative Buddhist passages.

A sentient being does exist, you think, O Mara? You are misled by a false conception. This bundle of elements is devoid of Self, in it there is no sentient being. Just as a set of wooden parts receives the name of carriage, so do we give to elements the name of fancied being.29

Buddha has spoken thus: "O Brethren, actions do exist, and also their consequences, but the person that acts does not. There is no one to cast away this set of elements, and no one to assume a new set of them. There exists no Individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements."29

The heretics speak of a self which is distinct from the khandhas. But they describe its mark without having apprehended the true status of the self. They have not understood that it is merely a metaphorical designation, and from fear they do not progress to the insight that the self is nothing but a mere word.30

Both Buddhism and Nietzsche embrace anatta, and for similar reasons. However, that is only one component (the no-saying part) of Nietzsche's conception of the self, as it is only one aspect of the traditional Buddhist view. While Buddhism denies the existence of a substantial "soul atom," it does maintain that what we call "self" is the mutable, changing collection of the khandhas or the five constituents of the personality. The khandhas or "aggregates" are form, feeling or sensation, perception, impulses, and consciousness. This idea of the self as a collection of qualities is familiar to analytic philosophers as the Bundle Theory.

In one sense, there is a self according to Nietzsche, namely a bundle-self, the agglomeration of different drives. So when Nietzsche denies the existence of an ego

(2000) argue that Nietzsche's views were not inconsistent, but rather that Nietzsche was attracted to two complementary views of the self, both of which have roots in classical Buddhism, a religion that profoundly influenced his thought. A revealing clue to the complexity of Nietzsche's thought on the self can be found in Beyond Good and Evil (§54). After some familiar linguistic criticisms of the ego, he writes,

At bottom, Kant wanted to prove that, starting from the subject, the subject could not be proved—nor could the object: the possibility of a merely apparent existence of the subject, "the soul" in other words, may not always have remained strange to him—that thought which as Vedanta philosophy existed once before on this earth and exercised tremendous power.

The reference to Vedanta philosophy in this passage is more than an aside; it indicates the depth of Nietzsche's respect for the Buddhist doctrine of anatta, the denial of a substantial self. Allowing that Nietzsche respects Buddhism is not to say that his was an uncritical admiration; it is hard to think of any school, doctrine, or group that Nietzsche did not criticize to some degree. Yet compared with Christianity, for example, Nietzsche claims that Buddhism is a hundred times more realistic and objective (The Antichrist §20, §23), and that it lacks the ressentiment that characterizes Christianity (The Will to Power §179). One further failing peculiar to Christianity but not Buddhism is a belief in an indestructible, eternal, indivisible soul. Nietzsche declares that we must "give the finishing stroke to that ... calamitous atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the soul atomism" (Beyond Good and Evil §12). Buddhism, per contra, teaches anatta, or the denial of a uniquely enduring self.
or an "I," he is not rejecting such a bundle of drives and experiences. The sort of self whose existence he does repudiate is well described by Thomas Reid.

My personal identity . . . implies the continual existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, acts, and suffers.31

Just as Buddhism maintains that to speak of a self distinct from the khandhas is a sign of heresy, so too Nietzsche decries the Reidian notion of an immutable self distinct from a bundle of drives and affects. Either personal identity does not imply a "soul atom," as Reid believes, or diachronic identity is established some other way, or the nature of personal identity is at some level a decision, a pragmatic issue that ultimately fails to rest upon a deeper metaphysical fact.

It is this last view that Nietzsche endorses. If the Buddhist anatta is a denial that there is a determinate answer to all questions about the self, one grounded in or corresponding to metaphysical reality, then this too is consistent with Nietzsche's position. This is not to say that nothing intelligible can be said about the self, or that there is no philosophical understanding of the self to be had, but rather that for Nietzsche personal identity is more amorphous and less straightforward than one might suppose. In this respect the Bundle Theory and the No-Self view are different sides of the same coin, and appreciation of both is necessary for an adequate understanding of Nietzsche's thought about personal identity.

**CONCLUSION**

Nietzsche's reputation in the 20th century has shifted dramatically, from a jackbooted proto-fascist, to a wild-mustached proto-postmodernist, to now a somewhat eccentric fixture in the philosophical firmament. His writing resembles nothing in analytic philosophy journals, and it is no surprise that analytic philosophers in particular have had a difficult time appreciating his thought. But his views are clever and subtle, and grappling with them repays the reader manyfold. The challenge in Nietzsche scholarship remains to heed his warning in Ecce Homo (preface §1): "Above all, do not mistake me for someone else."32

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**NOTES**

2. What accounts for this boom? Obviously, scholars are attracted by Nietzsche’s unusual ideas, pandemic interests, and brilliant writing. More practical considerations may be at work too. It is only within the last 20 to 30 years that reliable English translations of Nietzsche’s published writings have been completed, primarily by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Even these excellent and now standard translations are being challenged by The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, edited by Bernd Magnus, currently in production at Stanford University Press. Based on the authoritative Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke edition edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Stanford projects 20 volumes in The Complete Works. Beyond “complete” are the masses of unexplored notebooks Nietzsche left behind, which now reside in the Nietzsche Archives in Weimar. With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Nietzsche Archives are now more accessible and better preserved, and this too has fueled scholarly interest. On the status of the Archives, see Magnus (1997).

3. That the published works are a distinct minority of Nietzsche’s output is ironically demonstrated by Magnus.

4. A famous photograph of Nietzsche shows him and his friend Paul Rée pulling a cart. The driver of the cart, with a whip in her hand, is Lou Salomé. Several wags have suggested that the real message of the old woman in Zaratustra is that if one is going to woman, take the whip but then hand it over to her! Nietzsche was a meek, sickly professor full of words about boldness, the will to power, and respect for dominance instincts. It is difficult to avoid the speculation that he was a masochist.

5. Hayman 1980, p. 64. The widespread view that Nietzsche’s insanity was due to untreated tertiary syphilis is medically unsubstantiated and based on circumstantial evidence: his illness was consistent with that diagnosis, syphilis was widespread in 19th-century Europe, and Nietzsche’s admission to Paul Düssener that he had visited a brothel in 1865 (although Nietzsche claimed to have touched nothing but a piano).


9. A more comprehensive overview of Nietzsche’s fortunes in the twentieth century can be found in Behler 1996.


11. Anderson 1998; Clark 1990, chap. 5; Leiter 1994; Nehamas 1985. It must be noted that while these writers treat perspectivism as epistemological in nature they do not all agree that perspectivism is compatible with the possibility of objective truth and knowledge.

12. Hinman (1982), Stack (1981), and Gemes (1992) are all sympathetic to this idea.

13. For example, Poellner (1995, p. 299), and Hales and Welshon (2000, chap. 1).


18. Such a case is laid out in Hales 1995.

19. Nietzsche’s criticisms of utilitarianism can be found in Beyond Good and Evil (§§118, 225, 228, 291), The Gay Science (§4), and Twilight of the Idols (1:12).
20. For example, the accounts of Hunt and Welshon, which were written at approximately the same time, have no substantial disagreements between them, as Hunt (1992) acknowledges.

21. See Welshon (1992) for citations for these claims.


23. Schacht 1983, pp. 130–133


32. Thanks to Wendy Lee-Lampshire, Scott Lowe, and four referees for American Philosophical Quarterly for criticisms of an earlier version of this essay.

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